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1 Introduction.
The role of causality in physics presents a problem. Although physics is widely
understood to aim at describing the causes of observable phenomena and the
interactions of systems in experimental set-ups, the picture of the world given
by fundamental physical theories is largely acausal: e.g. complete data on times-
lices of the universe related by temporally bidirectional dynamical laws. The
idea that physics is acausal in nature, or worse, incompatible with the notion
of causality, has attracted many adherents. Causal scepticism in physics is most
associated with Russell’s (1913) arguments that a principle of causality is in-
compatible with actual physical theories. For causal sceptics, insofar as causal
reasoning is used in physics, it is at best extraneous and at worst distorts the
interpretation of a theory’s content.
Mathias Frisch’s Causal Reasoning in Physics (CRP) is an engaging, persua-
sive and timely defence of the legitimacy and importance of causal reasoning
in physics. Frisch demonstrates that causal scepticism can be overcome via a
proper appreciation of the pragmatics of modelling within physics. Frisch ar-
gues that causal reasoning plays a key role in physics in this representational
way, holding that “there is no good reason for not treating causal structures on
a par with other kinds of representational resources that we employ in physics,
such as dynamical laws or other kinds of constraints” (p. 11). In this piece I’ll
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first summarise what I take to be the key steps in Frisch’s defence of causality
in physics and, second, assess the significance of the alleged indispensability
of causal reasoning in physics. Granted that causal reasoning is indispensable
from physics in the sense Frisch describes, it does not follow that physics is
‘causal’ in a way that conclusively dispels causal scepticism about physics.
2 Overview of Causal Reasoning in Physics.
To situate the position of CRP, we can ask:
Q. Is causal reasoning (i.e. the application of causal principles and assump-
tions):
(a) Possible in physics?
(b) Actually used in physics practice?
(c) Indispensable from physics practice?
Frisch answers ‘yes’ in each case. However, the consequences in each case are
left open, with Frisch taking his project to entail “no commitment to any partic-
ular causalmetaphysics” (p. 34), nor a pronouncement on the status of causality
in ‘fundamental’ physics. Rather, CRP demonstrates that causal assumptions,
principles and structures play a central role in the application of established
classical theories.
The ‘causal structures’ Frisch describes are the Markovian directed acyclic
graphs central to the Bayesian causal modelling frameworks of Pearl (2000) and
Spirtes et al. (2001), in which causation is understood in interventionist terms,
as further developed byWoodward (2003). Causalmodelling has answered one
of (the 19131) Russell’s concerns—a rigorous account of causality is applicable
to mature scientific theories, and so is not an anti-scientific relic of folk theory.
However, it is commonly held that causal modelling is inapplicable to physics
due to key differences between physics and the special sciences. Causal mod-
elling involves: (a) the assignment of probability distributions over variables,
and so an incomplete knowledge of the microscopic state of a system; and (b)
interventions understood as ‘exogenous’ variables, i.e. from outside the sys-
tem in question. Physics, however, aims at generality and completeness—the
1Russell (1927) defends the legitimacy of causal assumptions in science in his causal theory of
perception.
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ideal physical theory describes the complete microstate of the world as a closed
system, with higher-level phenomena being supervenient upon parts of this
micro-structure.
Frisch argues that this picture overlooks key features of physics practice. Al-
though abstract physical theories may be understood as sets of complete pos-
sible world models, it doesn’t follow that such idealised models represent the
world. Frisch (ch. 2) defends a pragmatist account of scientific representation
according to which a model represents some phenomenon only if it is used in
such a way. On this account, complete abstract theory models cannot represent
the world since this would require a total knowledge of the state of the world
and an unfeasible amount of computation. This pragmatist account allows one
to understand physics as retaining the key features of imprecise knowledge and
incompleteness necessary for Markovian interventionist approaches to causal-
ity (chapters 3–4), countering the claim that causal modelling is inextendible to
physics; Frisch holds that “[m]odeling in physics [. . . ] is no less hospitable to
causal reasoning and causal structures than is modeling in the special sciences”
(p. 234).
Representation is key to Frisch’s treatment of Russellian-style incompatibil-
ity arguments (ch. 4–5). Incompatibility arguments typically proceed by taking
a theory to consist of dynamical laws and constraints, and showing that these
lack the asymmetries sufficient to motivate a causal interpretation. Frisch re-
jects the idea that physical theories are “exhausted by [. . . ] formulas or state-
space models” (p. 113), holding this to overlook the role of causal reasoning in
their construction and confirmation. Frisch shows how taking the pragmatics
of modelling in physics into account serves to resolve standard incompatibility
arguments—in particular the alleged incompatibility between the time symme-
try of physical laws and the time asymmetry of causation (ch. 5).
Having made the case against causal scepticism, Frisch details the function
and importance of causal assumptions in specific cases of physics practice: first
in linear response theory (ch. 6); and second in classical electrodynamics (ch.
7). The book closes with a convincing critique of ‘entropy theories’ of causa-
tion, which seek to reduce the directionality of causation to the time asymme-
try of thermodynamics (ch. 8). There is much valuable and insightful content in
these chapters that warrants further discussion, particularly Frisch’s illuminat-
ing analysis of the Einstein–Ritz correspondence (ch. 7), but due to constraints
of space the remainder of this review focuses on the details of Frisch’s rejection
of causal scepticism.
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3 Discussion.
CRP’s case against causal scepticism is convincing insofar as causal reasoning
is shown to be both applicable to and practically indispensable from physics for
agents with our epistemic and computational limitations. However, there are a
couple of key senses in which causal scepticism remains legitimate in light of
CRP, which I’ll now detail: first, at the level of fundamental theories; second,
in systems that lack sufficient probabilistic asymmetries for the assignment of
causal arrows by causal discovery algorithms.
3.1 Causality and fundamental physics.
Frisch’s claim that causal modelling can be extended to classical physics raises
the question of what it means to label physics ‘causal’. Frisch restricts his claims
to classical theories—inwhichmodelling practices closely resemble causalmod-
elling in the special sciences—and not to “truly fundamental” theories (p. 23).
This leaves open what to make of fundamental physics. Regardless of the prag-
matics ofmodelling in physics, quantumphysics poses a problem: the violation
of the Bell inequalities by quantum systems implies the existence of correlated
variables that violate the Causal Markov Condition (or alternatively violate an-
other causal modelling axiom, e.g. causal faithfulness—cf. Wood and Spekkens
(2015)—, or licence retrocausality—cf. Price (1994)). If some part of physics is
‘causal’ only if its modelling practices sufficiently resemble those of the special
sciences, then theories that violate key axioms of causal modelling, e.g. quan-
tum theories, are not causal, and so by CRP’s lights fundamental physics is
largely acausal. This is problematic for a couple of reasons. First, it reopens the
door to causal scepticism at the level of fundamental physics. Second, CRP ap-
pears unable to accomodate putative ‘quantum causal models’—which adopt
alternative sets of axioms for causal discovery and require screening-off to be
understood as something like a classical approximation of a quantum causal
structure2—as being properly causal.
3.2 The epistemology of causal direction.
Central to CRP is Frisch’s rejection of the alleged incompatibility between time-
asymmetric causal structures and the time symmetry of fundamental physics
(ch. 5). Though Frisch’s defence of compatibility is convincing, there is greater
2Cf. Leifer and Spekkens (2013); Henson et al. (2014); Costa and Shrapnel (2015).
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agreement between Frisch and causal sceptics than is implied byCRP’s polemic.
Let’s focus on Frisch’s treatment of Norton’s (2009) example (which I simplify)
of a possible world consisting solely of two processes: ‘A’ and its time reverse,
‘B’. The crux of Norton’s argument is that a ‘principle of causality’ (i.e. that an
effect cannot precede its cause) can be applied to A if and only if an inverse
causal principle applies to B, since by time reversal symmetry A and B share
the same physical properties and so can’t be distinguished on causal grounds
without violating physicalism. Frisch notes that Norton presupposes that “the
physical properties of a physical system are exhausted by those captured in the
dynamical equations governing the system” (CRP, p. 122), and that A and B
can be distinguished on extrinsic grounds—relative to a wider causal environ-
ment containing the right kind of probabilistic asymmetries for the assignment
of causal arrows via causal discovery algorithms. Though Frisch is right in that
a wider causal environment is generally available to break the underdetermina-
tion in practice, this reasoning overlooks the implications of the lack of intrinsic
differences between A and B.
Consider the case that the environment lacks the requiredprobabilistic asym-
metries. One could be: (1) a hyperrealist—hold there is a direction of causation
that outruns the physical facts; or (2) a deflationist—hold there is a direction
of causation only in the presence of the right kind of probabilistic asymmetries
(e.g. irreversible processes, time-asymmetric screening-off conditions, etc.), and
so no direction in this case. I read CRP as taking a deflationist attitude and
to be opposing a hyperrealist approach. Otherwise, it’s not clear why causal
arrows should match those prescribed by causal discovery algorithms—after
all, they come apart precisely in this case. The deflationist position is taken
by Reichenbach (1956) in this context, holding that for highly time-symmetric
systems, causal-direction-talk breaks down. Central to Reichenbach’s account
of the direction of causation is the thermodynamic asymmetry: entropy gradi-
ents, rather than being explained by causal structures, are constitutive of causal
structures.
If Frisch is a deflationist about causal direction, then he shares key concerns
withNorton, and also Price andWeslake (2010), despite arguing against them in
this context. Price andWeslake criticise hyperrealism in that it makes the direc-
tion of causation “epistemically inaccessible and practically irrelevant” (Price
andWeslake, 2010, sec. 1.2), which Frisch reads as implying that “[i]n a physics
with time-symmetric laws that pose a well-defined initial-value problem, there
can be no empirical justification for positing causal relations” (CRP, p. 125). But
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Price and Weslake’s criticism is of hyperrealists who hold there is a fact about
causal direction in the absence of causal reference points. In the case where a
wider causal environment is available, it’s unclear why either Norton or Price
and Weslake would disagree with Frisch that a deflationist principle of causal-
ity is viable—there’s no requirement for a causal sceptic to make this stronger
claim. Though Frisch entertains a ‘non-Humean’ reading of causal principles in
the conclusion of CRP (p. 244)—amounting to a hyperrealist reading—, I don’t
see how this is compatible with CRP’s general thesis of deferring to Markovian
causal models as constitutive of causal relations. On a hyperrealist reading, to
the contrary, the direction of causation is logically independent of the causal ar-
rows given by causal discovery algorithms. It appears preferable to read CRP
as deflationist.
4 Closing thoughts.
Causal Reasoning in Physics deserves significant attention in the literature. It
makes the best case there is against causal scepticism in physics, and addition-
ally offers a detailed and engaging account of the function of causal reasoning
in the application of physical theories. There is, I have argued, an important
sense in which a restricted causal scepticism is compatible with the position of
CRP, namely where traditional causal modelling techniques break down, such
as in quantum theories and in sufficiently probabilistically symmetric systems.
This is not to undermine the central claims of CRP, but rather to give them the
right caveats and to emphasise the deflationist aspects of CRP.
Finally, is the indispensability of causal reasoning from physics in tension
with the claim that fundamental physical theoriesmotivate an acausal ontology?
On the one handphysics is an enterprise that crucially involves causal reasoning
in the construction and application of theories; on the other, physics, more than
any other science, aims at an acausal picture of the world wholly independent
of the contingencies and asymmetries of our perspective, and it is precisely in
this sense that symmetries such as time reversal invariance play a key role. I
feel no significant tension in being sympathetic towards both the causal and
acausal pictures as different but complementary accounts of physics. I take the
key lesson of CRP to be that the former picture is at least as legitimate as the
latter.
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